Volume 4, Issue 20 (1-2007)                   cs 2007, 4(20): 85-95 | Back to browse issues page

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Navidi H, Abdoly G. Government Managing on the Behavior of Auditors And Taxpayers When there Probability of Evasion in the Tax Reports . cs. 2007; 4 (20) :85-95
URL: http://cs.shahed.ac.ir/article-1-292-en.html
Abstract:   (8722 Views)

  In this paper we are going to investigate the collusion between tax payers and tax auditor (inspector) in order to take evasive action in taxpaying, in a simple game theatrical model. In this model from the government (or tax administration) view point, there are kinds of tow auditors: honest and dishonest and There is the probability that the taxpayer may collude with dishonest auditors, and repeat the tax low. Therefore, in this model there are three players: taxpayers, auditors, and the Government. The aim of the government in this game is to select a strategy that maximizes tax incomes and minimizes tax evasion (net income). We found a condition in which the net income maximized the collusion parameter.

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Type of Study: Research | Subject: Special

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