In this paper we are going to investigate the collusion between tax payers and tax auditor (inspector) in order to take evasive action in taxpaying, in a simple game theatrical model. In this model from the government (or tax administration) view point, there are kinds of tow auditors: honest and dishonest and There is the probability that the taxpayer may collude with dishonest auditors, and repeat the tax low. Therefore, in this model there are three players: taxpayers, auditors, and the Government. The aim of the government in this game is to select a strategy that maximizes tax incomes and minimizes tax evasion (net income). We found a condition in which the net income maximized the collusion parameter.
Navidi, H. & Abdoly, G. (2020). Government Managing on the Behavior of Auditors And Taxpayers When there Probability of Evasion in the Tax Reports. Commercial Strategies, 4(20), 85–95.
MLA
Navidi, H., & Abdoly, G. "Government Managing on the Behavior of Auditors And Taxpayers When there Probability of Evasion in the Tax Reports", Commercial Strategies, 4, 20, 2020, 85–95.
HARVARD
Navidi, H., & Abdoly, G. (2020). 'Government Managing on the Behavior of Auditors And Taxpayers When there Probability of Evasion in the Tax Reports', Commercial Strategies, 4(20), pp. 85–95.
CHICAGO
Navidi, H. & Abdoly, G., "Government Managing on the Behavior of Auditors And Taxpayers When there Probability of Evasion in the Tax Reports." Commercial Strategies, 4 20 (2020): 85–95,
VANCOUVER
Navidi H., Abdoly G. Government Managing on the Behavior of Auditors And Taxpayers When there Probability of Evasion in the Tax Reports. Commercial Strategies. 2020;4(20):85–95 (In Persian).
