In this paper we are going to investigate the collusion between tax payers and tax auditor (inspector) in order to take evasive action in taxpaying, in a simple game theatrical model. In this model from the government (or tax administration) view point, there are kinds of tow auditors: honest and dishonest and There is the probability that the taxpayer may collude with dishonest auditors, and repeat the tax low. Therefore, in this model there are three players: taxpayers, auditors, and the Government. The aim of the government in this game is to select a strategy that maximizes tax incomes and minimizes tax evasion (net income). We found a condition in which the net income maximized the collusion parameter.
Navidi,H. and Abdoly,G. (2020). Government Managing on the Behavior of Auditors And Taxpayers When there Probability of Evasion in the Tax Reports. Commercial Strategies, 4(20), 85-95.
MLA
Navidi,H. , and Abdoly,G. . "Government Managing on the Behavior of Auditors And Taxpayers When there Probability of Evasion in the Tax Reports", Commercial Strategies, 4, 20, 2020, 85-95.
HARVARD
Navidi H., Abdoly G. (2020). 'Government Managing on the Behavior of Auditors And Taxpayers When there Probability of Evasion in the Tax Reports', Commercial Strategies, 4(20), pp. 85-95.
CHICAGO
H. Navidi and G. Abdoly, "Government Managing on the Behavior of Auditors And Taxpayers When there Probability of Evasion in the Tax Reports," Commercial Strategies, 4 20 (2020): 85-95,
VANCOUVER
Navidi H., Abdoly G. Government Managing on the Behavior of Auditors And Taxpayers When there Probability of Evasion in the Tax Reports. Commercial Strategies, 2020; 4(20): 85-95.
